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In the early part of the XIX century, American politics had a local flavor. Power resided most often
in the county or town, sometimes in the state, and only rarely in Washington, D.C. (Dahl 1989;
Young 1966). Weak parties proved incapable of articulating national political identities and
Congress operated in large part reactively to the given issues of the day. While a true national
stage for politics would not emerge until the end of the century (Clemens 1997) the political
divisions of the 1820s posed a severe challenge for the newly formed Republic. The dangers of
factionalism so clearly spelled out by James Madison in Federalist #10 appeared very concretely
in the second decade of the nineteenth century for example, when bitter fights ruled the life of
Congress.
Yet despite the political fragmentation that characterized this period, by 1830, the contours of a
national political stage had emerged (Formisano 1983). For certain, the process of political
consolidation that created the stage for national politics could not be accredited to the new parties
that formed from the ashes of the Republicans and the Federalists. The Whigs and the
Democrats continued to be weak organizations as were their predecessors—in 1836, for example
the Whig ʻpartyʼ had at least 4 presidential candidates (Formisano 1974). Historians have looked
at the underlying social and economic processes that from the early nineteenth century began
transforming the United States from an agricultural country to an industrial super power in order to
explain the emergence of national politics amidst weak parties (Marshall 1967). Political scholars
have instead argued that consolidation of politics on the national stage emerged from the
presidential campaigns that created awareness of the regions from which candidates emerged
(McCormick 1966). In this paper, however, we set these underlying processes firmly in the
background and focus on a more proximate cause for the ideological consolidation that led to the
emergence of a national political stage—Congressmenʼs living arrangements.
Our argument is simple. Congressmen who lived together in what were known as
boardinghouses had more opportunities to interact with each other and, therefore, to influence
each otherʼs opinions (Bogue and Marlaire 1975). The fact that Washington, D.C. at the time was
largely a town “under construction” that offered few alternatives to the routines imposed on
Congressmen by their jobs magnified the impact of the residential informal networks. These
networks, more than the parties or the presidential campaigns, became the basis for the
formation of a national political stage (Young 1966).
That a venue—the boardinghouses in our case—rather than a party, or system of parties, could
become the basis for the consolidation of a political system is not surprising. Parties themselves
are often born out of venues with ideology following the more or less lucky first gathering. For
example, in writing about the Jacobins of 1789, Maurice Duverger argued that members of this
party gathered together because they all came from the same region of France. They became an
ideological group, a party, only afterwards, when the French Assembly was transferred from
Versailles to Paris. “This time, no room in a café being available, the leading spirits hired the
refectory of a convent, and it was under the name of this convent that they were to become
famous in history” (1954: xxv). In this account, the relationship between political opinions and
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political parties is the reverse of what most casual observers imagine. In revolutionary France,
representatives got together first and then recognized their common interests and ideological
similarities. This paper claims that boardinghouses—not cafes or monasteries—played a similar
role in post-revolutionary American politics. The result of the discovering of common interests
across multiple localities led to the emergence on the national stage of the North / South divide—
the main cleavage of national politics during the nineteenth century (Lipset and Rokkan 1967).
In this paper therefore we do not model the formation of the American second party system.
Instead, we are interested in analyzing the underlying institutional process of ideological
consolidation that sustained the emergence of the key cleavage of American politics—the division
between Northerners and Southerners. We ask the following question—given the fact that
American parties remained weak organizations, which institutions generated the structuring of
positions between a Northern bloc of congressmen and its equivalent in the South so that their
political differences consolidated on the national stage?
Of course, we do not want to fool anybody—Washington, D.C. was not (and perhaps still is not),
Paris. No cafes existed within the perimeter of the city during the period of our analysis. James
Sterling Young reports that when the government arrived in Washington, D.C. there were only
109 permanent structures (brick and stone) and that the War of 1812 only made things worse
(1966). What existed, however, and what political scientists have largely overlooked, were
boardinghouses, places where Congressmen lived while serving in Congress. These
boardinghouses became the basis for the formation of informal networks of Congressmen and,
our evidence shows, for the recognition of common interests above those of local politics. The
boardinghouse was the institution underlying the emergence of the North / South cleavage in the
first part of the nineteenth century.
We will show evidence that boardinghouses exerted influence on the individual voting behavior of
Congressmen. In particular, we will show that it was only when Congressmen from the South
lived with other Congressmen from the South that they realized their commonality of interests.
The same occurred in the case of Northerners. The homogeneity of the residential networks
exerted political pressure on Congressmen to vote in alignment because it reinforced the
emergence of a dominant perspective. Further, we will use a particular aspect of our data—
Congressmen that moved between boardinghouses at the end of first session—to separate the
impact of selection from that of political influence. Rather than choosing to live together on the
basis of common regional interests, Congressmen recognized these interests because they lived
together.
While we have evidence showing that boardinghouses influenced the voting of Congressmen,
and that the direction of this influence reinforced the North / South divide, we are still in the
process of coding and analyzing more data for showing the ideological consolidation at the
national level that boardinghouses generated. Thus, the conclusions that this paper draws are
necessarily tentative.

Politics in Washington, D.C., circa 1820s
Congressmen of the early nineteenth century hated Washington, D.C. as much as contemporary
Congressmen hate it today. In those days, however, the hate for the new capital was not just
another rhetorical trick in the politicianʼs bag. The city had very minimal infrastructure and, for
example, the low ground in between the White House and Capitol Hill was, literally, a swamp! At
the beginning of the century, very few buildings existed. Young writes: “When the government
arrived in 1800, only 109 “permanent” structures (brick or stone) stood in all of Washington, to
house the 500 families already residing there and an additional 300 civilian members of the
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government, many of them with families of their own. The commissioner then reported 372
dwellings as ʻhabitable,ʼ but, as a cabinet officer noted, ʻmost of them are small miserable hutsʼ”
(1966: 22). The war with England in 1812 only made things worse. When Congressmen returned
to the city in 1814, they found the situation so desperate that talks of abandoning Washington,
D.C. for good became dominant. Indeed the House came within nine votes to decide in that
direction.
In this unforgiving environment, Congressmen stuck together. In the early part of the century, the
great majority of Congressmen were part of boardinghouses, also known as messes. Young
reports that messmates took their meals together, lived together and spent most of their leisure
time together. Messes were largely established along regional lines, yet states were rarely
unified in a single mess. Messes had up to 30 members. While the number of Congressmen
residing in boardinghouses progressively declined with the passing of time, it remained a salient
phenomenon until the middle of the nineteenth century.
Undoubtedly, Congressmen thought living in Washington, D.C. was onerous also because of the
distance of national politics from the seat of their real power—the county or the state. In the first
two decades of the century, Congress more resembled organized chaos than a functioning
political institution (Formisano 1983). There were no formally recognized party leaders and
seniority as a basis for political rank was very weak. Fueling this lack of leadership stood deeply
engrained political practices. For example, Sarah Binder reports that, although by the 1820s
referral of bills to standing committees would become far more routine, ʻJeffersonianʼ attitudes
toward the legislative process continued to have legitimacy: “…subjects were debated on the floor
in the Committee of the Whole before being sent to ad hoc select committees for drafting as a bill”
(1995: 1096). For a few Congressmen, the weak institutional setting that Congress offered and
the precarious infrastructures of the city proved too much to bear—resigning the national post in
order to return to local politics was a common practice in the 1820s.
National politics was not only a dispersive environment but was also very heterogeneous.
Disparate issues dominated Congressional life during the 1820s, such as, for example: (a) the
th
composition of a delegation to the Panama Congress (19 Congress); (b) military appropriations
th
st
(20 Congress); (c) the Indian Removal Act (21 Congress). On these issues and on several
relevant others that we do not report for lack of space, Congressmen sorted themselves out on
the basis of locally, state-centered interests rather than using a national outlook. The byproduct of
this was that politics at the Federal level had a muddled ideological structure. For example, during
th
the 18 Congress the W-NOMINATE score for all rollcalls (Poole and Rosenthal 1997) returns an
th
ideological space fractured along five dimensions. Things improved marginally during the 19
Congress.
In sum, national politics in the 1820s appeared very weakly organized, with Congressmen mostly
loyal to their local interests and anxious to leave the Capital as soon as possible. However,
because the majority of Congressmen lived together, small communities formed. By spending
time together in boardinghouses Congressmen became aware of similarities across regional
differences and, in a manner very similar to the emergence of parties in Europe (Sartori 1976),
they developed a common ideological ground. In the remaining part of the paper we will show that
this process of ideological consolidation at the national level led to the emergence of the
North/South cleavage.

Data
th

The 19 Congress marks the beginning of our period of analysis. We chose this starting point
because it is traditionally considered the institutional birth of the second party system. Using
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several different sources, we constructed a database with all Congressmen from the 19 to the
th
26 Congress. First, we coded the information of where Congressmen resided in Washington DC
from Goldman and Young (1973), which lists the names of the boardinghouses for each session
and the names of the people that resided there.
Next, we looked at ICPSR study 3371, Database of Congressional Historical Statistics 1789-1989,
for biographies about each Congressman. We also gathered rollcall data from voteview.com,
which has been curated by Howard Rosenthal and Keith Poole. Finally, we pieced this
information together with committee assignments taken from Charles Stewart's website at MIT.
th

th

For each session in the period from 1825 to 1840 (the 19 to the 26 Congresses) we know the
identity of each Congressmanʼs boarding mates and their voting records. Three things are worth
noting about boardinghouses. First, the number of Congressmen in each boardinghouse changed
session by session. This is because other guests, non-Congressmen, also lived in these
establishments and occupied some of the rooms. In our data, we do not have the identity of these
other residents.
Second, the number of boardinghouses appearing in the directory also changes session by
session. Some boardinghouses remain in the directory for all of the sessions while others appear
for few sessions or for a single session. This source of variation is, however, less problematic
than the previous one because we know exactly when Congressmen lived in private dwellings,
that is, not in a boardinghouse. Our data include the residence of all Congressmen for each
session, regardless of their type of residence. Therefore, although the number of boardinghouses
changed with each session we are confident that our database includes all the boardinghouses
active during the period 1825-1840.
The third important piece of information regarding boardinghouses is that a subset of
Congressmen moved at the end of each session from one boardinghouse to another. Given that
we know their voting records before and after the move, this switching of boardinghouses allows
us to create a quasi-experimental scenario for untangling the impact of selection and influence.
We will come back to this point more precisely in the hypothesis section but the analysis of
Congressmen that moved between boardinghouses (movers) makes possible the development of
a strong causal argument about the effect that residential informal networks of Congressmen
generated.
Despite the richness of information contained in our database, we have no direct data on the
network of relationships between Congressmen that lived in the same boardinghouse. We do not
have proof, for example, if Congressman X became a friend with Congressman Y while living in
the same boardinghouse. Therefore, we assume that boardinghouses provided a natural locus for
the formation of informal networks. The conditions in Washington, D.C. described above
potentially exacerbated the salience of boardinghouses in creating informal networks because
few places for local gathering existed at this time in the city. Further, historical secondary
evidence confirms our intuition. Congressmen living in the same boardinghouse had frequent
interactions with each other. In light of all of this, we think that our decision to use boardinghouses
in order to capture informal networks of Congressmen is very plausible.
Given the lack of infrastructure in DC, the self-reported addresses for the boardinghouses have
several inconsistencies. It was sometimes difficult to determine whether boardinghouses with
similar names appearing in successive sessions were in fact the same residence. In order to
disambiguate these cases, we did our best to uniquely identify the location of boardinghouses
using a historical map of the city. This helped to resolve most of the ambiguous cases. When in
doubt, we treated similar boardinghouses as separate residences, so as not to give them a false
persistence through time. A possible consequence of this strategy is to suppress the effects of
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boardinghouse influence on movers, as some of those movers perhaps did not actually move. As
this suppression would be counter to our hypotheses, any results we find may in actuality be
stronger than the reported values.
The table below reports briefly some of the information about boardinghouses for each Congress
included in the analysis. The empty rows are those for which we are still in the process of coding
data.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics about boarding houses
Two things are readily spotted. The first is that the majority of Congressmen resided in
boardinghouses. The second is that almost half of the Congressmen moved between sessions.

Hypotheses
The precarious state of Washington, D.C.ʼs infrastructure made the boardinghouses one of the
few venues where Congressmen could convene informally and socialize. Although we do not
have data on the informal relationships among Congressmen, we take the boardinghouses as
proxies for these relationships. Congressmen living together shared and often discussed political
ideas or the issues of the day. Away from home, boardinghouses created small communities for
their residents.
Sociologists have shown the importance of informal networks in the functioning of organizations
and institutions (Meyer and Rowan 1977). More recently, political scientists have also turned their
attention toward informal networks to analyze political behavior in Congress (Fowler 2006) and
the formation of political parties (Schwartz 1990). In line with this research, our broad hypothesis
is that the networks created by the boardinghouses in the nineteenth century influenced the
political behavior of their residents. In the remaining part of this section, we refine this broad
hypothesis in three directions: first, by specifying the mechanism through which the
boardinghouse exerted influence on Congressmen; second, by stating the political consequences
of this pressure; and third, by stating a causal argument about how this mechanism operated.
Boardinghouses influenced political behavior because they created informal networks of people
living there. They were, in this sense, more than just a place where Congressmen lived; they
formed the basis of small communities. Because of this, the political profiles of Congressmen
residing in the same boardinghouse can be used to discern the mechanism that exerted pressure.
In particular, we hypothesize that the greater the number of people with a similar profile living
together—being from the same region, party, profession, etc—the stronger the amount of political
pressure of the informal network on the individual political behavior. Thus,
H1: Larger and more homogeneous boardinghouses exerted greater
pressure on the voting behavior of their residents.
Given the salience of local, state-centered politics, recognizing common interests across different
locales meant that Congressmen from the South or the North would vote more with their
colleagues on either side of the two blocs rather than across. Because it was by living together
that Congressmen realized their common interests outside of local towns and counties, our
hypothesis is that territorially homogeneous boardinghouses led to the emergence of the North /
South cleavage on the national stage. Whereas voting independently of larger groupings would
imply the persistence of a local outlook—a Southern Congressman ignoring regional orientation
as a meaningful distinction, for example—voting with oneʼs own side would mean the emergence
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of a national stage for politics—a Southern Congressman recognizing common interests with
other Southern Congressmen.
H2: Congressmen living in territorially homogeneous boardinghouses voted as to
reinforce the North / South cleavage, everything else equal.
Yet, in order to causally show that the emergence of the territorial cleavage was a consequence
of living arrangements, a closer look at how Congressmen selected boardinghouses as their
residences is necessary. It may be the case that the consequence of pressure on each
Congressmen to vote in alignment with other boardinghouse members was that Congressmen
voted differently from what they would have voted had they lived somewhere else (or alone).
However, it could also be the case that Congressmen chose to live with people that they thought
were politically similar. Network analysts call this phenomenon homophily—the tendency to
become friend with people similar to us (Watts, Dodds, and Newman 2002). If homophily was at
play, the pressure of the boardinghouses would operate to reinforce the political opinions of its
residents. That is, Congressmen would select where to live and, in our implicit model, who to
befriend, on the basis of the political behavior of other residents. In such case, our argument
about boardinghouse pressure would need to be inverted: Congressmen selected boarding
houses on the basis of the communality of interests with the other tenants.
To untangle a pure influence effect from the issue of selection, we look more closely at the voting
records of the group of Congressmen that moved between sessions for each Congress in our
data. If movers selected the second boardinghouse on the basis of the political behavior of its
residents, the Congressmen who lived in the selected boardinghouse during the previous session
are expected to have a political profile similar to that of the mover. Instead, if movers selected the
boardinghouse irrespective of the political profiles of its residents, we expect not to see
similarities between the profiles of its residents and the mover during the previous session.
Further, if informal networks exerted political influence, we expect that the moverʼs voting records
correlate highly with the records of Congressmen at the destination boardinghouse during the
current session. More formally:
H3a (homophily): If a Congressman selected the boardinghouse to move to on the basis
of the political profile of its residents, a positive and strong correlation exists between the
voting record of the mover and the voting records of the members of the destination
boardinghouse during the first session.
H3b (influence): If the pressure of informal networks caused a Congressman to change
his voting behavior, the voting records of the movers will be weakly correlated with that of
Congressmen living at the destination boardinghouse at the end of the first session, and
strongly correlated with the voting records of Congressmen living at the destination
boardinghouse at the end of the second session.

Statistical Model
We focused the analysis on the North / South division. For each session we calculated the
percentage that either a Southerner congressmen voted with the North or vice-versa. We
calculated this percentage using roll calls for all congressmen. For example, if a Southerner voted
to pass a particular bill along with the majority of Northerners, and the majority of Southerners
voted against it, then that individual was considered to have voted with the other region. We then
took the number of all such occurrences for each member over the total number of votes in a
particular session, and created a variable for each Congressman in each session that ranged
between 0 and 1. This became the dependent variable in our analysis.
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The fact that politics was deeply local was our starting assumption in developing this measure. If
Congressmen focused exclusively locally, they would be indifferent to the territorial cleavage.
Conversely, if Congressmen developed a sense of their common interests, they would tend to
vote significantly less with the opposite side. In line with historical literature (Levine 1992), we
discarded as anachronistic the fact that voting in opposition with oneʼs own bloc would indicate
the emergence of a pan-American political stage. Thus, considering the salience of local politics
at the time and in line with H2, we interpreted voting with the opposite side not as evidence of
ideological structuring at the national level but on the contrary, as evidence of weak national
politics.
We considered our dependent variable as capturing a latent individualʼs propensity to see politics
as either informed mainly by local, state-centered issues or by national issues. This latent
dimension can take values greater than 1 if a Congressmanʼs political orientation is strongly
towards the other region, or smaller than 0 if a Congressman saw communality of interests with
his own region. In this latter case, politics at the national level would result in the emergence of
the North / South cleavage. Because of the nature of our dependent variable, we treated the
interval between 0 and 1 as a two-sided censoring estimation problem and employed a Tobit
model with left and right censoring for our analysis (Tobin 1958). More formally the model we
estimated using the VGAM package in R was the following:

Where yi* is the latent individual propensity observed only within the interval 0, 1 and xi is a vector
of explanatory variables, beta is a vector of unknown parameters and ui is the disturbance term.
We used control variables at the individual level and at the level of the boardinghouses. At the
individual level we coded a series of dummy variables (being in the Jackson Party, coming from a
slave state, being a lawyer or businessman, having military experience, being a college graduate,
being a new congressman, being a member of the House) and the individualʼs age. At the level of
the boardinghouse we used the same control variables but in the form of proportions, i.e., the
proportion of Jacksonians living in the same boardinghouse, the percentage of college graduates
living in the same boardinghouse, etc. We also controlled for the size of the boardinghouse, i.e.,
how many congressmen lived together during a given session.

The mechanism of social pressure
The relevance of the pressure mechanism is independent of its political consequences. A
boardinghouse could have reinforced the regional identity or it could have generated a new cross
regional, more national, political outlook. What we care to show in this part of the analysis, is the
mechanism through which this pressure was exerted. According to H1, the pressure of the
informal networks depended on the homogeneity of the boardinghouses. With respect to our
dependent variable, and controlling for individual attributes, we expected that a more
homogeneous boardinghouse would generate more pressure toward shaping a Congressmanʼs
vote, irrespective of its direction (H1). A positive effect would mean a greater likelihood of voting
with the opposite side, that is, of thinking that the larger aggregates South or North donʼt matter
much compared to local issues. In this case, national politics remains weak. A negative sign

4th Annual Political Networks Conference and Workshops, June 14-18, 2011	
  

7	
  

would mean a smaller likelihood of voting with the opposite side, that is, a greater tendency of
seeing similarity of interests with Congressmen from the South or the North. In such a case,
national politics would emerge as a relevant stage for Congressmen. H2 predicts a significant and
negative effect of the boardinghouses in that they would operate toward making the Northerners
(or Southerners) more aware of their common interests across states, counties and towns.
We tested this hypothesis for each session of Congress between 1825 and 1833 and also for the
th
two sessions of the 24 Congress (1835-1837). We are currently in the process of coding more
rd
th
th
data for the 23 , 25 and 26 Congresses (see Table 1 above). The table below reports the
st
nd
results of the Tobit model for the 1 session of the 22 Congress as an example. The same
analysis was repeated for all the sessions in our data.
Table 2: Tobit model for the first session of 22

nd

Congress

In Model 1, two factors are significant: being a Jacksonian and being newly elected. Both factors
operate toward decreasing the national outlook (greater likelihood of voting in opposition, see the
positive sign for the coefficients) of the Congressman. However, when controlling for the effect of
boardinghouse, both effects wash out. Model 2 shows that informal networks made prevalently of
college graduates and newly elected Congressmen significantly altered individual political
behavior. While the latter factor continued to decrease the development of a more national
outlook, the former factor made Congressmen more tied territorially. Model 2 confirms the fact
that political parties were very weak institutions at the time—once controlling for boardinghouses,
the effect of being a Jacksonian disappears.
It is Model 3 that displays the most interesting results. The territorial division between North and
South emerges very strongly but only once we factor in the interactions. A Congressman from the
North living with many other Northerners had -.176 less chances of voting with the other side and
therefore it was that much more likely to see his local interests in line with that of other
Congressmen from the North (notice that the sign of the coefficient is reversed because we are
looking at percentage of Northerners, rather than percentage of Southerners as it is presented in
the table). This voting pattern is in line with what we predicted in H2. Similarly, a Southern
Congressman living in a boardinghouse with many other Southerners had a greater chance of
voting with the interests of other Southerners in mind (compare the magnitude of the negative
interaction coefficient with that of “Slave State” at the boarding house level).
The boardinghouse pressure toward pulling Congressman apart on the North / South divide was
further reinforced with respect to other characteristics—being a college graduate and a
businessman. The only counterbalancing effect happened when considering age—older
Congressmen living together tended to be more locally oriented compared to networks made of
younger Congressmen. More relevant for the analysis, the size of the boardinghouse emerged to
be significant in Model 3. Larger boardinghouses were more likely to push for a national vote than
smaller ones, all things being equal. The significant effects reported in Model 3 were operating
through the mechanisms that H2 predicted.
While Table 2 confirms that the greater homogeneity of the informal networks was the
mechanism that created pressure, it also strongly confirms that boardinghouses were crucial for
the emergence of a key divide in American national politics—the North / South divide. The picture
below reports the predicted probabilities of a territorial vote by the percentage of Northerners or
Southerners in the informal networks. Both lines have a statistically significant and negative slope,
with the line for the case of a Southern Congressman steeper than for a Northerner.
Figure 1: Tobit model. Predicted probabilities
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The effect of homogeneity at least with respect to territory emerged at the interaction level for
both North and South but was stronger for the latter case. We repeated this analysis for all the
other Congresses currently in our data. The table below focuses on the effect for the South and
shows that the interaction effects operated in the same direction as shown in Table 2.
Table 3: Interaction effects
Because for the case for boardinghouses made of mostly Northerners the interpretation of the
findings is the same, we do not report a separate table. In both cases, informal networks created
pressure through homogeneity and operated toward creating awareness of common interests for
Congressmen from the South and the North, respectively. More than parties, Table 3 suggests,
the institutional foundation for the North / South split that would become the main axis of
American politics was in the informal networks developed on the basis of living arrangements.
The next section explores this idea in causal terms: Did the pressure mechanism cause
Congressmen to recognize their similarities or were boardinghouses selected on the basis of preexisting common interests?

A causal argument: The institutional foundation of the North / South divide
A large subset of Congressmen switched boardinghouses between sessions of Congress. This
switch creates a quasi-experimental situation because our database contains information not only
about the movers before and after the switch, but also about the voting records of the residents in
both boardinghouses, the one at the origin (first session) and the one at the destination (second
session).
Hypotheses H3a & b pose opposite scenarios. H3a states that if homophily were at play, the
correlation of the voting record of the mover with the voting records of the Congressmen in the
destination boardinghouse at the end of first session will necessarily be high. Conversely, H3b
implies that if Congressmen moved for idiosyncratic reasons, a weak correlation would exist
between the voting records of the mover and those of Congressmen at the destination
boardinghouse at the end of the first session. More importantly, H3b states that if informal
networks caused Congressmen to vote differently, we would expect a discrepancy in the voting
records of the movers before and after they switched boardinghouses.
The table below provides evidence of the fact that homophily did not affect moversʼ choices of
boardinghouses. At the same time, the table provides support for the hypothesis that
boardinghouse pressure caused a change in voting behavior.
Table 4: Voting correlations for movers
The first two columns report the average correlation coefficient for the movers with Congressmen
living in the origin boardinghouse and with Congressmen in the destination boardinghouse. For all
the cases for which we have data, the correlation coefficients in the second column are lower
than in the first. This indicates a lack of support for H3a.
Columns 3 and 4 instead provide evidence in support of H3b. Influence operated to increase the
correlation between Congressmen in the destination boardinghouse as compared to
Congressmen in the original boardinghouse. Correlations in column 4 are always greater than
those in column 3 and sometimes by a large margin.
This evidence is not conclusive because it only considers correlations. We are currently in the
process of extending the analysis by using a framework borrowed from Propensity Score
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Matching (PSM) analysis. Table 4 supports the hypothesis that movers did not choose
boardinghouses on the basis of the profiles of the residents. Thus, if we treat boardinghouses as
a random assignment, we can stratify the population of movers on the basis of territorial
homogeneity of the destination boardinghouse. On average, if movers to a more homogeneous
destination boardinghouse changed their voting records with respect to Congressmen living at the
boardinghouse of origin who did not move, this would indicate a causal effect of the informal
networks. A similar reasoning could be applied to see the effect of the “treatment on the treated”,
i.e., relating the voting records of the movers with themselves before and after the move.
Discussion
Our analysis provides support for the hypothesis that boardinghouses formed informal networks
that exerted political pressure on Congressmen. The mechanism behind this pressure was that
homogeneity with respect to certain individual characteristics, such as living with other
businessmen or college graduates, fostered the circulation of ideas that affected the political
behavior of the boardinghouse residents. We singled out one particular dimension of
homogeneity, that of being from either the South or the North. We noticed that in boardinghouses
made up primarily of Southerners, the likelihood of voting with other people from the South on all
issues increased significantly. The same is true for boardinghouses composed prevalently of
Northerners, although the degree to which pressure impacted political behavior was lower
compared to the other case. We take this finding to indicate that Congressmen discovered their
common interests while living together.
We developed a causal argument to show that informal networks caused the discovery of
common interests rather than the other way around. It was not the case that Congressmen chose
where to live on the basis of the profiles of the residents. It was instead more the case that
Congressmen discovered similarities with the other Congressmen with whom they ended up living.
This causal argument has important consequences for understanding the emergence of the North
/ South divide that characterized American politics for much of the nineteenth century. Differently
from countries in Europe, American parties did not operate as the primary institutions that allowed
for the recognition and the consolidation of political interests and ideological positions. Instead,
the evidence we amassed for our analysis suggests that at the roots of this process of mutual
recognition and simplification of the ideological space stood the informal networks centered on
boardinghouses.
These conclusions need to be taken with a grain of salt. In part it is because we are still in the
midst of coding some of the Congresses for which we have data and in part it is because we
need to strengthen our causal argument. With respect to the first aspect, our expectations are
that the inclusion of new data into the current framework will not upset our main conclusions. But
as everyone that has done research knows very well, surprises are always possible. With respect
to the second aspect, our goal is to extend the causal argument of the analysis as highlighted in
the previous section.
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Table	
  1:	
  Boardinghouse	
  descriptive	
  statistics.	
  
	
  
Congress

Years

Members of
Congress

Number Living in
Boardinghouses*

Average Size of
Boardinghouses*

Number
of Movers

19

1825-1827

261

218

5.8

115

20

1827-1829

261

182

5.9

102

21

1829-1831

261

197

5.8

125

22

1831-1833

261

209

6

145

1835 - 1837

294

239

6.3

128

23
24
25
26

	
  

* This excludes all residences with fewer than 3 members
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Table	
  2:	
  Probability	
  of	
  voting	
  with	
  the	
  opposite	
  side.	
  22nd	
  Congress,	
  1st	
  Session.	
  
Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

(Intercept):1

0.08693557

0.1864892

-0.6266386

(Intercept):2

-1.96930291

Intercept
***

-2.07358654

***

-2.20788175

***

Individual Variables
Jackson Party

0.05325293

Slave State

*

0.03780347

-0.01884552

-0.01153478

0.05108163

0.28053513

Lawyer

-0.00299088

0.01047968

-0.01230522

Businessman

-0.03649866

0.0102087

-0.00464193

Military Experience

0.03665579

0.02849654

-0.00066678

College Graduate

-0.03133854

-0.00568743

-0.09881904

New Congressman

0.05503858

0.00327421

-0.04301585

Age

0.00068106

0.00025658

0.02161589

Member of House

0.01310963

0.03454907

0.12426745

Jackson Party

-0.00590448

-0.06406897

Slave State

-0.07551656

0.17629156

Lawyer

-0.04225154

-0.04373594

*

***

*

Boardinghouse Variables

Businessman

-0.17636722

-0.21818696

Military Experience

0.08126194

0.00767451

College Graduate

-0.18340789

***

-0.33670124

New Congressman

0.15258846

***

0.09771317

Age

0.00209778

0.02164681

Member of House

-0.12885376

-0.00988214

Number of Inhabitants

-0.00168588

-0.01305187

***
*
***
*
***

Interactions
Jackson Party

0.11836338

Slave State

-0.50330988

Lawyer

0.03285951

Businessman

0.04190875

Military Experience

0.04694281

College Graduate

0.20390514

New Congressman

0.11504972

Age

-0.00046862

Member of House

-0.12769408

Log-likelihood

300.0457

321.3874

348.9528

Degrees of Freedom

401

391

382

***

*
*

Note: * = .05, ** = .01, *** = .001
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Figure	
  1:	
  Full	
  Tobit	
  model.	
  Predicted	
  probabilities.	
  22nd	
  Congress,	
  1st	
  Session.	
  
	
  
%	
  Voting	
  with	
  Other	
  Region	
  

0.4	
  
0.35	
  
0.3	
  
0.25	
  
0.2	
  

Southerner	
  

0.15	
  

Northerner	
  

0.1	
  
0.05	
  
0	
  
0.2	
  

0.5	
  

0.8	
  

%	
  Same	
  Region	
  in	
  Boardinghouse	
  
Note: Values set to modes or means, depending on whether binary or not, respectively
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Table	
  3:	
  Interaction	
  effects	
  
	
  
Congress

South

% South in Boardinghouse

19.1

Interaction

-

19.2

-

20.1

+

-

20.2

+

-

21.1

+

21.2

+

22.1

+

+

-

22.2

+

+

-

-

23.1
23.2
24.1

+

24.2

+

+

-

NOTE: All (+) and (-) significant at .05 level
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Table	
  4:	
  Voting	
  correlations	
  for	
  movers	
  
	
  

Congress

1st Session Correlations
With actual
With future
board.house
board.house

2nd Session Correlations
With past
With current
board.house
board.house

Self-correlation

19

0.51

0.4

0.5

0.69

0.71

20

0.56

0.52

0.35

0.61

0.68

21

0.5

0.46

0.48

0.7

0.35

22

0.64

0.14

0.68

0.78

0.87

0.52

0.38

0.38

0.58

0.61

23
24
25
26
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